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Abstract
 
An account of the history of human experimentation in the United States necessarily 
involves a recounting of scandals and the research policies that developed in response.  
This paper aims to provide a review of this history, along with observations about 
recurring themes that pervade the narrative.  In so doing, this author hopes to provide a 
useful reference, and also to reveal the inherent tensions and difficult problems posed by 
the conduct of research using human subjects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   1 
 
  In June 1769, 29-year-old physician William Stark began a new diet.  For 12 weeks he 
lived on bread and water with little sugar.  William became “dull and listless,” and his gums 
were swollen and bled easily.  In the following three weeks he “quite recovered” by varying his 
diet.  Then he returned to a diet of bread or flour, with various supplements such as olive oil, 
butter, suet, a little cooked lean meat, and honey.  By the end of December, his gums again 
became purpose and swollen.  On February 23, William died.
1  Most likely, William Stark died 
of scurvy.  In fact, his diet was an experiment to test the effects of simplified diets on health, for 
it was surmised that a deficiency of vitamin C could explain the onset of scurvy.
2   
In October 1939, John Crandon, a resident surgeon at Harvard Medical School, used 
himself as an experimental subject to research scurvy.  He placed himself on a diet of bread, 
crackers, cheese, eggs, beer, pure chocolate, and sugar with supplements of yeast and all the 
known vitamins other than vitamin C.  Crandon continued his surgical work throughout the 
experiment.  After twelve weeks, he felt fatigued.  After nineteen, his skin became dry and rough 
and hair follicles on his buttocks and the back of his calves began to develop hard lumps or 
“plugs” at the base.
3  After twenty-three weeks – that was seventeen weeks with no detectable 
vitamin C in his blood plasma – Crandon began to develop hemorrhages on his lower legs.  At 
thirteen weeks, he had a wound deliberately inflicted on his back, and showed normal healing 
after ten days.  After twenty-six weeks, he again had a wound inflicted, and showed no healing 
after ten days.  He was given a fatigue test, and he found that he could run at seven miles per 
                                                        
1 See KENNETH J. CARPENTER, THE HISTORY OF SCURVY AND VITAMIN C 200–01 (Cambridge 
University Press 1986). 
2 See id. 
3 This “hyperkeratosis” had previously been regarded as a sign of vitamin A deficiency, but 
Crandon tested for a normal level of vitamin A in his blood.   2 
hour for only sixteen seconds, and showed rapid exhaustion in other tests.  He was then given 
1,000 mg of ascorbic acid (vitamin C) each day for a week.  He noticed a subjective 
improvement in the first twenty-four hours, and the second wound healed rapidly in the 
following ten days. 
  Separated by nearly two centuries, these two physicians engaged in the same line of 
research, and engaged themselves as human subjects.
4  That they performed these experiments as 
medical scientists, rather than physicians, seems evident.  The protocol had no therapeutic value 
to Stark and Crandon – both undertook the research to advance what was known about scurvy.  
Crandon, for one, continued his work as a physician as the experiment went on; the experiment 
was a separate endeavor.   
  While the accounts of these endeavors in self-experimentation might be unsavory or even 
shocking to some, likely far fewer would find them unethical.  Each man assumed the risks of his 
experiment knowing the protocol, and knowing the “knowns” and “unknowns” about what might 
occur as a result.  Each man had control over the administration of the experiment and could, 
presumably, stop it at any time.  The experiment was a personal undertaking that did not affect 
the wellbeing of any other individual – except perhaps the physicians’ patients.  At least in this 
author’s judgment, the enterprise seems honorable.  Moreover, Stark and Crandon likely found 
several advantages to self-testing in terms of collecting experimental data.  Using himself as 
subject, each man had a constant ability to control and observe his subject.   
  All this changes, however, when medical scientist uses not himself, but another human 
being, as subject. 
                                                        
4 The next experiment of this kind was carried out in England during World War II, and was 
performed on volunteers who were conscientious objectors to military service.  See id. at 202. 
   3 
 
Walter Reed’s yellow fever research in 1900 was oft-cited before and during World War 
II as a precedent to justify military-medical human experimentation,
5 perhaps because he was 
widely though to have volunteered himself as one of the subjects.
6  Reed was assigned as an 
Army scientist to Cuba, where yellow fever had killed thousands more American soldiers than 
had the Spanish army in the recent war.  Most who caught the disease suffered a terrible fate.  
The skin would first begin to yellow.  Next would follow violent hiccupping and uncontrollable, 
persistent retching and black vomit, and death.
7  Reed hypothesized that mosquitoes carried the 
disease.
8   
  At first, Reed carried out his experiment in secret.  He had no permission from the high 
military authorities when he subjected the first volunteers, members of his commission, to the 
mosquito bite.  Only after Yellow Fever Commissioner Jesse Lazear became ill and died did 
Reed report to his commending general.
9  He informed him of Lazear’s death, and requested 
permission to use himself and other men as subjects, which was granted.
10  More men were 
recruited from among the soldiers stationed in Cuba.
11 
                                                        
5 JONATHAN D. MORENO, UNDUE RISK: SECRET STATE EXPERIMENTS ON HUMANS 16 (W.H. 
Freeman 2000). 
6 JONATHAN D. MORENO, IS THERE AN ETHICIST IN THE HOUSE?: ON THE CUTTING EDGE OF 
BIOETHICS 112 (Indiana University Press 2005). 
7 See MORENO, supra note 5, at 16. 
8 Id. at 17. 
9 Lazear was 34-years-old when he died.  He was a successful microbiologist trained in Europe, 
appointed as the first chief of clinical laboratories at Johns Hopkins Medical School.  He left 
behind a widow and two children.  Id. 
10 Although the military medical folklore is that Reed subjected himself to the bite, he actually 
left Cuba before the appointed day on which he was going to do so.  Id. 
11 Id. at 19.   4 
  The secretive nature of the experiment’s beginnings seem to indicate that there was at 
least an informal army policy prohibiting human experimentation.
12  Reed devised and presented 
the new volunteering soldiers with a contract, which warned them that they might die in the 
experiment (and also suggested that they might die outside of it).  The exact terms are unknown, 
but the volunteers were also offered some kind of financial reward.  Some Spanish immigrant 
workers were recruited and received money for their participation, but it has been claimed that 
the Americans declined the offer of compensation out of patriotism.
13  
  This initial modern American example of human testing exemplified several important 
themes that would emerge repeatedly in the subsequent history of human testing in America.  
First, that military emergency provided the impetus for the testing.  Reed was driven to, and 
perhaps felt justified in, his experiments because of the need to discover a remedy for a disease 
that had cost many American lives and compromised the robustness of American military 
operations.  Second, that the experiments proceeded in secrecy.  Although Reed was prepared to 
conduct his experiments, evidently he was not necessarily prepared to make others aware of his 
project, at least until he had achieved some progress.  Third, that the experiments took place in 
an environment in some manner isolated from the general American public, or at least the 
American public eye.  Reed’s experiments took place not on American soil, but in a military-
base environment in Cuba, apart from the awareness of the American layman.  Fourth, that 
consent was sought from the subjects.  Finally, that the ensuing perception of the experiment was 
affected by an understanding of the experimenter as a patriot or even a martyr.  The folklore that 
Reed subjected himself to the bite of the mosquito, alongside his subjects, seemed to have the 
effect of curing any ethical shortcomings of the experiment in the eyes of his successors.   
                                                        
12 Id. at 19. 
13 Id.   5 
 
In 1941, President Roosevelt created a Committee on Medical Research (CMR) to 
coordinate America’s medical research needs, should the U.S. enter the European war.  In the 
tradition of Walter Reed, the committee sponsored dozens of projects involving human subjects.  
Civilian and military officials struggled with the issue of whom to use in these experiments, but 
they had little time to deliberate and little guidance from existing codes or conventions.
14  In 
1942 a University of Rochester researcher, looking to research the prevention of gonorrhea using 
human subjects, asked CMR for “an opinion that such human experimentation is desirable.”
15 In 
response, the CMR chairman, in a statement endorsed by the full committee, wrote: 
[H]uman experimentation is not only desirable, but necessary in the study of many of the 
problems of war medicine which confront us.  When any risks are involved, volunteers 
only should be utilized as subjects, and these only after the risks have been fully 
explained and after signed statements have been obtained which shall prove that the 
volunteer offered his services with full knowledge and that claims for damage will be 
waived.  An accurate record should be kept of the terms in which the risks involved were 
described.
16 
 
  After the war, CMR’s work was summarized in a report called Advances in Military 
Medicine.  The report contained little information regarding attitudes about human testing, the 
method utilized to recruit subjects, or any applicable rules and policies.  It was, however, filled 
with tributes to the volunteer subjects.  For instance, in records of experiments regarding the 
effects of mustard gas, there were expressions of patriotic camaraderie with the subjects.  Yet 
there was no explanation of how the subjects had been recruited.
17  
                                                        
14 Id. at 15. 
15 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, FINAL REPORT pt. I, ch. 1, § 3 
(1995) available at http://www.hss.energy.gov/HealthSafety/ohre/roadmap/achre/index.html. 
16 Id. 
17 MORENO, supra note 5, at 25–26.     6 
  One Army project in the early 1940s clearly failed to meet the asserted CMR standard.  
At the Manhattan Project Army Hospital, studies of plutonium began in light of concern about 
the risks to laboratory workers, who were exposed to the substance on a daily basis.  Eighteen 
patients were injected with plutonium as part of the study.
18  All but the last of the patients was 
injected without having knowledge of the experiment or giving consent.  Three patients were 
told that the substance would “not necessarily” help them, but might help others.
19  The first 
seventeen injections took place during a time of war, and while it appears that there was no 
explicit permission to use some individuals as unwitting experimental subjects, it seems it was 
assumed that it could be done because of necessity for the war effort.  Yet, a U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) declassification officer wrote of a 1947 memorandum regarding the 
experiment:  
The document appears to be the most dangerous since it describes experiments performed 
on human subjects… Unless, of course, the legal aspects were covered by the necessary 
documents, the experimenters and the employing agencies, including the U.S., have been 
laid open to a devastating lawsuit which would, through its attendant publicity, have far 
reaching results.
20 
 
There was no evidence that consent had been obtained from the first seventeen subjects, and it 
was decided that the project should remain secret.
21 
  In 1947, the AEC was looking to confront its experiences with secret human experiments 
of this kind and set new rules for the future, according to which the AEC would fund researchers.  
In April and November of 1947, Carroll Wilson, the general manager of the AEC, wrote letters 
to Stafford Warren and Robert Stone, who were important players in the wartime Manhattan 
                                                        
18 Id. at 120. 
19 Id. at 126. 
20 Id. at 136. 
21 See id. at 137.  There was no sign of injury to the subjects, but ultimately President Clinton 
compensated them because of the failure of the experimenters to inform them and the subsequent 
cover-up.  Id. at 120.   7 
Project medical research.  Wilson wrote to them that clinical testing with patients could occur 
only where there was a prospect that the patient could benefit medically and only after the patient 
had been informed about the testing and there was documentation of consent by the patient.
22   
Wilson’s April letter was ostensibly given little distribution or effect.  The one known 
instance of observance of the letter was, in fact, with regard to the eighteenth subject of the 
aforementioned Manhattan Project plutonium experiment, who was injected at the University of 
California at San Francisco.  There is indirect evidence that someone at the university had been 
informed of Wilson’s letter, and in the eighteenth patient’s medical chart, there is documentation 
of knowledge and consent.  Yet Wilson’s prescription was not observed in its entirety, for there 
was no real expectation that the injection would have therapeutic effect for the subject.
23 
  In his second letter of November, Wilson again instructed upon the AEC’s requirements 
for human testing.  He described the conclusions of the AEC’s Medical Board of Review, a 
group appointed to review the AEC's medical program by the AEC chairman, David Lilienthal.  
In the letter, Wilson referred to the Board of Review’s June meeting, and quoted from a draft of 
the Board’s report to the Commissioners: 
The atmosphere of secrecy and suppression makes one aspect of the medical work of the 
Commission especially vulnerable to criticism. We therefore wish to record our approval 
of the position taken by the medical staff of the AEC in point of their studies of the 
substances dangerous to human life. We [the Medical Board of Review] believe that no 
substances known to be, or suspected of being, poisonous or harmful should be given to 
human beings unless all of the following conditions are fully met: (a) that a reasonable 
hope exists that the administration of such a substance will improve the condition of the 
patient, (b) that the patient give his complete and informed consent in writing, and (c) 
that the responsible next of kin give in writing a similarly complete and informed 
consent, revocable at any time during the course of such treatment.
24 
 
                                                        
22 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 
pt. I, ch. 1, § 2. 
23 Id. 
24 Id.   8 
The Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments (ACHRE), in a 1995 report, 
stated that it found little evidence of efforts to communicate or implement the rules stated by 
Wilson in this 1947 letters, despite that they were developed in response to a demand for clarity 
about the rules for the conduct of human research.
25  AEC's Division of Biology and Medicine 
(DBM), which directed the AEC's medical research program, did not routinely communicate 
Wilson’s statements in response to requests for guidance from non-AEC researchers.  For 
example, in April 1948 a university researcher wrote to DBM and inquired as to what should be 
done about “medical-legal aspects” and “permission forms” for a human experiment using 
phosphorous 32 for purely investigational, non-therapeutic purposes.  DBM did not reply with a 
statement of Wilson’s rules, but rather referred the researcher to the Isotopes Division at AEC-
sponsored Oak Ridge Institute for Nuclear Studies, a research hospital.  The Isotopes Division 
told the researcher that it could be “of little assistance,” but “understood that most hospitals do 
require patients to sign general releases before entering into treatment.”
26 
There is some indication that views on the matter remained unsettled within the AEC.  
For instance, the ACHRE found some evidence, in a document dated March 29, 1948, that the 
AEC’s Subcommittee on Human Applications recommended human radiation experiments not 
only when they would offer diagnostic and therapeutic value to their human subjects, but also 
when they would advance knowledge about radiation protection generally.  This stance would 
have changed the AEC’s policy as explicated in Wilson’s 1947 letters, which prohibited 
experimentation that was without any expectation of therapeutic benefit to the subject himself.
27 
                                                        
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id.   9 
CMR’s work exhibited again, like Reed’s work, the force of military concern and 
necessity in driving human experimentation, even in spite of uncertainty about the propriety of 
certain methods.  Again, an existing or impending military emergency left government officials 
and medical researchers with a feeling that there was little time for philosophizing about medical 
research ethics, and again much of CMR’s work proceeded in secrecy.  Moreover, again, consent 
was emphasized as a requirement to protect the rights of subjects, legitimize human 
experimentation, and guard against liability.   
Furthermore, another theme emerged: that the question of the propriety of human 
experimentation is often framed in terms of whether the protocol of the experiment provides the 
human subject with any therapeutic benefit.  Unlike the early scurvy experimenters, who very 
clearly performed their scurvy research wearing a “medical researcher hat” rather than a 
“medical caregiver hat,” physicians who use other individuals to advance their research 
persistently operate within an ambiguous realm.  To a sick individual, a physician is a caregiver.  
To a physician, however, a sick individual might be both a patient with therapeutic needs as well 
as a source of research data.  As this theme begins to emerge, the “therapeutic value” ideal seems 
to be a compromise between the dual roles of a physician, by which a medical researcher who 
performs human experimentation within this ambiguous realm can justify his work. 
 
  After the war, the Nuremberg trials put American defense planners on the defensive 
about the American use of human subjects for the war effort.  The Nazi defense team managed to 
turn the tables on the Allies during the course of the trial, by comparing Nazi practices of human 
experimentation to the human experiments that were performed in the U.S.
 28  In anticipation of 
                                                        
28 MORENO, supra note 5, at 54.   10 
this tactic, Dr. Andrew C. Ivy, the American Medical Association's official consultant to the 
Nuremberg prosecutors, drafted several principles of medical research, which would ultimately 
serve as the basis for some of the 10 Nuremberg Code principles.  It seems Ivy was chosen for 
his consultant position because, for one, some of his wartime research interests had corresponded 
in topic to some of the experiments that the Nazis had undertaken, with shocking methods, on the 
prisoners of the concentration camps.  Moreover, Ivy was known as a defender of animal 
experimentation against American antivivisectionists.
29   
  In July or early August of 1946, Ivy went to Germany to meet with the Nuremberg 
prosecution team.  While there to assist them with understanding the technical details of some of 
the experiments, he recognized that the prosecutors “appeared somewhat confused regarding the 
ethical and legal aspects” of human experimentation.  After his visit, upon the request of the 
Board of Trustees of the American Medical Association, Ivy penned a 22-page report.  In the 
report, Ivy laid out the “the rules” of human experimentation, which he stated were standards 
“well established by custom, social usage and the ethics of medical conduct.”  He wrote:  
1. Consent of the human subject must be obtained. All subjects must have been 
volunteers in the absence of coercion in any form. Before volunteering the subjects have 
been informed of the hazards, if any… 
2. The experiment to be performed must be so designed and based on the results of 
animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease under study 
that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment. That is, the 
experiment must be such as to yield results for the good of society unprocurable by other 
methods of study and must not be random and unnecessary in nature. 
3. The experiment must be conducted 
                                                        
29 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 15, at 
pt. I, ch. 2, § 2.  Ivy was later a proponent of the quack cancer drug Krebiozen.  FDA found that 
Krebiozen contained nothing but creatine monohydrate, a common body chemical of no 
medicinal value.  See Cancer: The Krebiozen Verdict, Feb. 11 1966, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,842474-2,00.html. 
 
   11 
(a) only by scientifically qualified persons, and 
(b) so as to avoid all unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury, and 
(c) so, that, on the basis of the results of previous adequate animal experimentation, there 
is no a priori reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur, except in such 
experiments as those on Yellow Fever where the experimenters serve as subjects along 
with non-scientific personnel.
30 
 
Ivy also delivered a copy of his report to the Nuremberg prosecution team.  It is not certain that 
the judges on the Nuremberg Tribunal actually saw Ivy’s report; however, comparing Ivy’s rules 
with the Nuremberg Code as issued by the Tribunal in August 1947, it is clear that the judges 
borrowed important elements of Ivy’s formulation, including voluntary consent, prior animal 
experimentation, avoidance of undue risk to subjects, and the right of the subject to bring the 
experiment to an end at any time.  Some of this was almost verbatim.  The judges also reiterated 
Ivy’s claim that his rules were already widely understood and followed by medical researchers in 
the U.S.
31  
Historian David Rothman has explained that even medical researchers in the U.S. who 
would have been aware of the events at Nuremberg did not seem to perceive the implications it 
might have for their own work as medical researchers.
32  Rothman explains, “the prevailing view 
was that [the Nuremberg medical defendants] were Nazis first and last; by definition nothing 
they did, and no code drawn up in response to them, was relevant to the United States.”
33  As one 
medical school professor put it, it was perceived as “a good code for barbarians but an 
unnecessary code for ordinary physicians.”
34   
                                                        
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at pt. I, ch. 2, § 5.  
33 Id., citing DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF HOW LAW AND 
BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 62 (Basic Books 1994). 
34 MORENO, supra note 5, at 80.   12 
Moreover, it appears that the aforementioned distinction between medical researcher and 
medical practitioner was, in the postwar period, unclear and elusive to the medical research 
community.
35 As explained by the 1995 report of the ACHRE, this was a period of great change 
in American medical science.
36  Many young clinical researchers at this time would have been 
trained under a paradigm of paternalism in medical practice, which encouraged physicians to 
take responsibility for determining what was in the best interest of their patients and to act 
accordingly.  Patients trusted their physicians with great authority and discretion, and doctors did 
not shy from creative treatment that could be called experimentation if it helped a patient.  The 
postwar period, however, brought with it significant advances in medical research practice as 
well as unprecedented expansion of universities and research institutes.
37  The ACHRE Report 
describes: 
Many more physicians than ever before were no longer solely concerned, or even 
primarily concerned, with aiding individual patients. These medical scientists instead set 
their sights on goals they deemed more important: expanding basic knowledge of the 
natural world, curing a dread disease (for the benefit of many, not one), and in some 
cases, helping to defend the nation against foreign aggressors. At the same time, this new 
breed of clinical researchers was motivated by more pragmatic concerns, such as getting 
published and moving up the academic career ladder. But these differences between 
medical practice and medical science, which seem relatively clear in retrospect, were not 
necessarily easy to recognize at the time. And coming to terms with these differences was 
not especially convenient for researchers; using readily available patients as “clinical 
material” was an expedient solution to a need for human subjects.
38 
 
  The Nuremberg Code, as a watershed development in human experimentation policy, 
illustrates the most prominent manner by which such policy has developed in America.  Namely, 
policy in the field of human research has persistently evolved in response to scandal.  Ivy’s 
                                                        
35 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 
15, at pt. I, ch. 2, § 3.  
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id.   13 
principals were manifestly drafted in order to manage a scandal of American research ethics, 
which would have had enormous public relations implications.  The American experience at 
Nuremberg also reveals another recurring theme:  the tension between secrecy and the evolution 
of policy.  Namely, while scandal drives policy, secrecy obstructs the revelation of scandal to the 
public, thus impeding the evolution of policy.  Much World War II-era human research was kept 
out of the public eye until the Nuremberg trials, and thus it was not until then that the 
government and medical research community was forced to respond by formulating and 
articulating ethical standards. 
 
  Soon after Nuremberg engendered this hour of doubt and reflection on the ethics of 
medical research in the United States, the pressures of a new postwar world pushed medical 
researchers even further, as part of the U.S. effort to seek scientific advantages over its potential 
new enemies.
39  In 1952, a funding proposal was submitted to the director of the CIA for a 
project “[t]o develop an offensive capability in the covert use of biological and chemical 
materials, including the production of various psychological conditions which could support 
clandestine operations,” and “[t]o develop a comprehensive capability in the field of covert 
chemical and biological warfare that would give us knowledge of the enemy’s theoretical 
potential, thus enabling us to defend ourselves against a foe who might not be as restrained in the 
use of these techniques as we are.”
40   
This proposal became the basis for the MKULTRA project, established in April 1953.  Its 
purpose was to research and develop chemical, biological, and radiological materials for 
clandestine operations, capable of controlling or modifying human behavior.  As described by 
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Richard Helms, the assistant deputy director for plans and the author of the 1952 proposal, 
MKULTRA sought to investigate “the development of a chemical material which causes a 
reversible, nontoxic, aberrant mental state, the specific nature of which can be reasonably well 
predicted for each individual.”
41  Such a material, he said, could “aid in discrediting individuals, 
eliciting information, implanting suggestions and other forms of mind control.”
42  The project 
lasted for 10 years, and although many of the records were ordered destroyed by the Chief of the 
Technical Services Division, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, enough documentation was inadvertently 
saved to expose the program.
43   
There were 149 MKULTRA subprojects, many of them involved with research into 
behavior modification, hypnosis, drug effects, psychotherapy, polygraph studies, truth serums, 
pathogens and toxins in human tissue, knockout drops, and testing or administering drugs 
surreptitiously.
44  One of the first MKULTRA studies was conducted at the National Institute of 
Mental Health Addiction Research Center in Lexington, Kentucky, which was working with the 
CIA to develop new, mind-altering drugs.  In exchange for volunteering to participate in 
experiments, young patients, usually drug addicts serving various sentences for drug violations, 
were offered the drug of their addiction.  Some payments consisted of heroin and morphine.
45   
MKULTRA also included research projects regarding the administration of LSD, many 
of which were conducted at the Army Chemical Warfare Laboratories in Edgewood, Maryland.  
The program included ninety-five human subjects.  For one experiment, researchers created a 
simulated social reception where they surreptitiously administered doses of LSD to volunteers.  
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The volunteers were not aware of the nature or purpose of the experiment in which they were 
participating.  After the administration, some were polygraphed, and others were confined to 
“isolation chambers.”
46  In collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the CIA also 
covertly tested LSD on patrons of San Francisco and New York bars in a project dubbed 
Operation Midnight Climax.  The CIA had hired drug-addicted prostitutes to pick up men and 
bring them back to CIA bordellos, where they would be enticed to drink alcohol laced with LSD.  
CIA researchers watched through two-way mirrors.
47 
  A most infamous incident of the LSD experiments occurred on November 18, 1953, 
when ten scientists from the CIA and Fort Detrick, including Dr. Gottlieb, gathered for a 
conference at a secluded cabin in Deep Creek Lake, Maryland.  The scientists agreed that they 
would require unsuspecting human subjects in order to verify the effects and potency of LSD.  
One of the officers, Dr. Robert Lashbrook, poured seventy micrograms of LSD into a bottle of 
Cointreau to be served after dinner the following evening.  Several conference participants 
partook in the laced Cointrau, and twenty minutes later – once odd and boisterous behavior 
commenced – Dr. Gottlieb told the group what they had done.  One subject, a civilian employee 
of the army named Dr. Frank Olson, had taken a drink of the Cointrau and felt especially edgy 
that night.  He was unable to sleep, and the following morning he was completely fatigued and 
unable to concentrate.  Shortly thereafter he became paranoid, and within days sank into a 
depression so severe that Dr. Lashbrook recommended immediate medical treatment.  Olson 
flew home to Washington to spend Thanksgiving with his family.  Once he reached the airport, 
however, he was too fearful to face his family – knowing his mind had changed – and had to be 
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returned to New York for more psychiatric consultations.  Ultimately, Olson jumped out the 
window of his Manhattan hotel room, to his death.
48 
  For the ten years of its execution, MKULTRA was kept absolutely secret.  In 1963 an 
inspector general survey of the Technical Services Division led to a revelation about the projects, 
including the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting, nonvoluntary human subjects.  
This spurred an investigation that put a stop to the research.  Following a report by the inspector 
general, MKULTRA was terminated in 1964.    
  MKULTRA was yet another example of the force of national security-related concerns in 
driving medical experimentation.  It also, of course, was another example of experimentation 
proceeding in secret.  In the MKULTRA case, secrecy had dual significance.  Namely, secrecy 
was crucial to protecting military intelligence and preventing a public relations crisis.  The 
function of secrecy in preventing public outrage, however, has the coincident function of 
insulating medical research, at least temporarily, from the moral judgment and ethical evaluation 
of the public – another recurring theme.  Thus, secrecy impedes the evolution of policy not only 
by slowing the rate at which officials are forced to deal with scandal, but also by keeping the 
ethics of the general community, rather than the medical research community, from informing 
policymaking.   
 
  Along with the CIA’s interest in human experimentation, the military’s interest 
intensified during this period, especially as the Korean War began in mid-1950.  There was no 
Department of Defense (DOD) policy, however, to permit or guide researchers in performing 
human experimentation to study the topics of the military’s interest – chemical, biological, 
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atomic, and radiation warfare.  From 1950 to 1953, discussions about human experimentation 
policy were held in several high-level DOD panels headed by civilian researchers, including the 
Armed Forces Medical Policy Council (AFMPC), the Committee on Medical Sciences (CMS), 
and the Joint Panel on the Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare.  A DOD attorney, Stephen S. 
Jackson, suggested to the AFMPC that their proposal for a human experimentation policy be 
modeled after the Nuremberg principles, with an additional rule barring experiments with 
prisoners of war and an additional requirement that consent be expressed in writing, before at 
least one witness.  It appears that the AFMPC proposal was unpopular among other DOD 
committees, but it had the support of President Truman’s Secretary of Defense, Robert A. Lovett.  
The AFMPC strongly recommended the Nuremberg Policy to the incoming Eisenhower 
administration’s Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson.
49   
On February 26, 1953, Secretary Wilson issued a Top Secret memorandum to the 
secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, approving of the AFMPC’s proposed Nuremberg 
policy, with the modifications suggested by Jackson.  The policy of the Wilson memorandum 
would “govern the use of human volunteers by the Department of Defense in experimental 
research in the fields of atomic, biological, and/or chemical warfare for defensive purposes.”
50  It 
stipulates that any proposed experiment of this kind, along with the name of the person who will 
conduct the experiment, be submitted for written approval by the secretary of the department in 
which the experiment will be conducted, and that the Secretary of Defense be informed.
51 
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  The 1995 ACHRE report, however, indicates that there were problems with the 
dissemination and communication of Wilson’s secret memorandum.  Within a year of the 
memorandum’s issuance, it reports, officials of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project 
(AFSWP) solicited guidance from DOD regarding the use of human subjects in experimentation.  
This inquiry was precipitated by a routine review of reports, upon which an AFSWP reviewer 
found that some volunteers had been injured in a flashblindness experiment at an atomic bomb 
test site, which had been conducted prior to the issuance of the Wilson memorandum.  The 
AFSWP reviewer discovered the Wilson memorandum policy upon further inquiry, but found 
that “no serious attempt [had] been made to disseminate the information to those experimenters 
who [had] a definite need-to-know.”
52  Thus, it seems the effect of secrecy again exerted itself to 
the detriment of human research policy.  Namely, beyond creating tension with the development 
of policy, secrecy creates a tension with the effective communication of policy once it is 
promulgated.   
 
Roughly a decade later, Congress acknowledged similar problems to those of DOD with 
the lack of policy regarding human experimentation, in private civilian industry.  A Senate 
subcommittee chaired by Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee had begun in 1959 to investigate 
the conduct of pharmaceutical companies, and found that it was common practice for these 
companies to provide samples of experimental drugs to physicians.  The drug companies would 
then pay the physicians to collect data on their patients taking the drugs.  Physicians would 
prescribe the drugs, which had not been proven safe and effective, to patients without their 
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knowledge or consent.
53  In 1962, Congress passed the Kefauver-Harris amendments, which 
amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 to require pharmaceutical 
companies to obtain informed consent from patients in the testing of investigational drugs.  
Consent was not required when, “according to the best judgment of the doctors involved,” it was 
“not feasible” or was not in the best interests of the patient.
54  In 1963, FDA promulgated 
regulations echoing the informed consent requirements of the amendments.
55  
The passage of the amendments came on the heels of the thalidomide disaster in Europe, 
Canada, and to a very small degree, the United States.
56  Starting in late 1957, the sedative 
thalidomide was given to pregnant women, thereby causing thousands of birth defects in 
newborn infants.  The tragedy was widely covered by the television networks, stunning 
Americans who saw images of the affected infants.  A prominent defect was in the upper-limbs, 
often including the absence of both arms or phocomelia.  In some cases, the newborns virtually 
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lacked all four limbs.
57  The Kefauver-Harris amendments thus responded to scandal; namely, 
the public’s anxiety about the protections, or lack thereof, of patients who might receive 
experimental drugs from their physicians. 
 
During the 1960s, Dr. Henry Beecher, a Harvard professor of anesthesiology and well-
known researcher, became a hero in medical ethics for his exposure of numerous human 
experiments.  In 1959, he published an article in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association called “Experimentation in Man.”  He wrote that it is “unethical and immoral to 
carry out potentially dangerous experiments without the subject’s knowledge and consent.”
58  He 
was, however, a severe critic of the Nuremberg code.
59  Beecher criticized the Code’s 
requirement that experimental subjects ought to have sufficient knowledge of the proposed 
experiment before they agree to be subjects, inasmuch as very few people, he asserted, have the 
expertise to truly understand the hazards of an experiment.  Even the scientists themselves might 
not fully comprehend the mysteries involved, especially in advance, he wrote.  Beecher also 
objected to the Code’s assertion that human experiments should not be “random.”  Many medical 
breakthroughs, he said, had occurred by accident, including the discovery of X-rays and 
penicillin, as well as anesthetic agents.  Beecher wrote:  “It is not my view that many rules can 
be laid down to govern experimentation in man.  In most cases, these are more likely to do harm 
than good.”
60 
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In 1966, Beecher published a controversial paper entitled “Ethics and Clinical Research” 
in the New England Journal of Medicine.  In the article, Beecher identified twenty-two cases of 
published medical research utilizing human subjects that he found unethical.
61  This was an 
unprecedented act of whistle-blowing, and was regarded as scurrilous by many of his former 
colleagues.
62  Beecher claimed in his paper that it was not a willful disregard of patients’ rights 
but rather thoughtlessness and carelessness that accounted for most of the abuses he discovered.  
Emphasis on human experimentation, Beecher found, was sound.  The trouble, however, was 
that the vast resources available for such experimentation surpassed the supply of responsible 
investigators.
63  For moral and legal reasons, Beecher wrote, “consent” should be the goal 
emphasized in all cases; but often consent in any fully informed sense would not be attainable.
64  
The more reliable safeguard, he found, was “the presence of an intelligent, informed, 
conscientious, compassionate, responsible investigator.”
65  
  Beecher’s paper reflected again the way in which the concealment of human 
experimentation from the public eye impedes the development of ethical standards that are in 
tune with the conscience of the general community.  Beecher’s view that many of the abuses he 
discovered were products of “thoughtlessness” and “carelessness” suggests that medical 
researchers struggle to conceptualize the ethics of their experimental protocols with the morals of 
the community in mind.  It is perhaps not until their experiments are subjected to the scrutiny of 
the public eye, or at least some outside opinion, that some medical researchers can see the ethical 
issues that inhere in their experiments. 
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Among the instances of unethical published research that Dr. Beecher identified was an 
infamous cancer experiment performed at the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital in 1963.  With 
funds from the U.S. Public Health Service and the American Cancer Society, researchers at the 
hospital aimed to determine if foreign cancer cells would live longer in debilitated non-cancer 
patients than in patients with cancer, and also if cancer could actually be induced by injection of 
live cancer cells.  The researchers did not tell their subjects, patients with and without cancer, 
that the injections contained cancer cells, and later explained that they “did not wish to stir up 
any unnecessary anxieties in the patients who had phobia and ignorance against cancer.”  Still, 
the doctors claimed that oral consent had been obtained.
66   
  Some younger doctors who had patients at the hospital heard about the experiments and 
complained to a hospital board member who was also a lawyer, William Hyman.  He sued to 
obtain records of the experiment.  Three years later, in 1966, the case consummated with the 
New York Board of Regents taking the virtually unprecedented step of censuring the doctor who 
had performed the research, along with the director of the hospital who had agreed to the 
research, placing them on one year of probation.
67   
The Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital case has been cited as the first incident since the 
Nuremberg trials themselves to draw widespread attention to issues of research ethics.
68  
“Homegrown” scandals, it is said – unlike the Nazi experiments, which seemed so extreme and 
distant – truly began to change attitudes about the rights of research subjects in the 1960s.
69   
Included in the many disturbed by the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital incident was James 
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Shannon, the director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in Bethesda, Maryland.  The 
NIH started as a government-sponsored cancer research laboratory and grew into a vast 
enterprise, including a number of institutes specialized in research on various diseases, as well as 
a pioneering research hospital called the Clinical Center.  Using federal funds, the NIH is able to 
pursue scientific inquiry that might not be profitable, and thus unattractive to private industry.  
Some NIH work is done by its own scientists, but it is performed in great measure by experts 
throughout the country who receive NIH funding.
70  Shannon understood the vulnerability of a 
growing federal agency such as the NIH, and that its moral integrity would be the key to its 
continuing to receive public support.
71   
  In the same year of the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital Case, 1963, a researcher who 
was partially funded by the NIH transplanted a chimpanzee kidney into a human.  The patient 
had consented, but there was no reason to believe that the transplant would work, or that the 
performance of the procedure would provide enough new information about animal-to-human 
transplants to justify the risk to the patient.  Though Shannon was at the helm of the NIH, he 
heard about the incident in the newspapers.   
Disquieted by these disturbing cases and concerned by the growing attention paid to 
research ethics, Shannon created a committee in late 1963 under the direction of the NIH 
associate chief for program development, Robert B. Livingston, whose office supported centers 
at which NIH-funded research took place.
72  The committee was charged with studying problems 
of inadequate consent and the standards of self-scrutiny involving research protocols and 
procedures, and also with recommending controls for the protection of human subjects in NIH-
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sponsored research.  The committee recognized unethical research like that of the Jewish Disease 
Hospital cancer experiments could wreak havoc on public perception, increase the likelihood of 
liability, and inhibit research.
73   Yet, it was concerned about the NIH “taking too authoritarian a 
posture toward research oversight.”
74  Thus, in its report to Shannon in 1964, the committee did 
not recommend any changes in NIH policy.  It urged deference to physician autonomy and the 
traditional regard for the sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship and, moreover, warned that, 
“whatever NIH might do by way of designating a code or stipulating standards for acceptable 
clinical research would be likely to inhibit, delay, or distort the carrying out of clinical 
research.”
75 
Shannon was disappointed with the Livingston Committee’s report.
76  He felt that the 
NIH should take increased responsibility for research ethics, especially in light of the Jewish 
Chronic Disease Hospital case.
77  Still, he used the report as the basis of discussions with the 
U.S. Surgeon General, Luther Terry, in 1965.
78  Together, Shannon and Terry proposed to the 
National Advisory Health Council (NAHC), an advisory committee to the surgeon general of the 
Public Health Service, which includes the NIH, that the NIH should assume responsibility for 
formal controls on individual investigators.  Shannon argued for impartial prior peer review of 
the risks research posed to subjects and questioned the adequacy of the current protections for 
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human subjects.
79  In 1966, the Public Health Service ordered that anyone who wanted to 
perform human experiments using its funds must meet certain standards, including informed 
consent and review of the experiment in advance by a committee composed of professional and 
public members.
80  This peer review requirement was a significant acknowledgment of the 
aforementioned problem, demonstrated by the examples in Henry Beecher’s paper, that medical 
researchers may have difficulty seeing the ethical issues involved in their experiments. 
 
  In the same year that the Public Health Service ordered these new safeguards for human 
experimentation, another scandal of human experimentation came into the public eye, involving 
a New York State institute for the mentally ill called Willowbrook, located on Staten Island.  
Like many other institutions of its kind, Willowbrook was experiencing great demand and 
overcrowding.  By the mid-1960s, it was filled to more than twice its intended capacity.
81  After 
it had officially closed its doors to patients, Willowbrook offered admission to retarded children 
if their parents would agree to allow them to be part of a hepatitis study.  With few other options 
available to them, parents agreed.  The consent forms the parents signed stated that their children 
were to receive a vaccine against hepatitis, instead of accurately indicating that they would be 
infected with the disease.
82  
The research team was led by Saul Krugman of New York University, and before 
beginning the work, Krugman had discussed it with many colleagues, and gotten approval from 
the New York University School of Medicine and the Armed Forces Epidemiological Board, 
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which also provided funding for the research.
83  When a review committee for human 
experimentation was formed in 1955, it too approved the research.
84  As the experiment began, 
the researchers took stools from hepatitis-infected individuals and used them to make extracts, 
which were then fed to healthy subjects.
85  The experiment lasted from the mid-1950s to the 
early 1970s and was well known in the medical research community, inasmuch as Krugman’s 
team had published many articles fully describing the experiment and its protocol.
86  Later 
confronted about the experiment, the researchers justified their work, saying the children would 
have gotten hepatitis within six months at Willowbrook regardless of the experiment, so that it 
was better to have them participate in a controlled study, because of which they would be 
monitored and given treatment.
87  Moreover, Krugman claimed that the parents of each subject 
had received detailed information about the research prior to signing a consent form, without any 
pressure to enroll their child.
88 
  The Tuskegee syphilis study, brought into the public eye by a journalist in 1972, shared 
with the Willowbrook study that insiders – here, public health officials at all levels of 
government and researchers – knew of the research, but it was shocking news to the general 
public.
89  In 1932, the venereal disease division of the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) 
began a study in Macon County, Alabama, to follow the effects of untreated syphilis in some 400 
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African-American men (along with a control group of 200 non-infected African-American 
men).
90  The subjects were recruited to the study with offers of free medical examinations, and 
once selected to be subjects, they were not informed as to the nature of their disease or of the fact 
that they would derive no therapeutic benefit from participating.
91  The study was not 
intentionally secret, but neither was it widely announced or subjected to review by an 
independent advisory group.
92  The study went on for forty years.  As described by David J. 
Rothman,  
The study continued through World War II, when a number of the men were called up for 
the draft and, had they not be research subjects, would have receive medical attention for 
their infection.  It continued through the 1950s, after the efficacy penicillin treatment was 
established, and after the Nuremberg trials produced a code of ethics for biomedical 
research.  It lasted through the 1960s, untouched by the civil rights agitation, and 
unaffected by the code of research ethics adopted by the USPHS itself.  It ended only in 
1972, when an account of the experiment in the Washington Star sparked a furor.
93 
 
Furthermore, over the course of the forty years of the experiment, at least 28 participants died 
and approximately 100 more suffered blindness and insanity from untreated syphilis.
94   
  The Willowbrook and Tuskegee cases demonstrate the recurring disconnect between the 
ethical conscience of the general public and medical researchers’ conceptions of their own 
experiments.  It is certainly charitable to attribute the ethical shortcomings of these experiments 
to failure of perception, but if Beecher’s assertions are to be taken seriously, this does often play 
a significant role in human experimentation abuses. 
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In 1972, the Tuskegee study made the front page of the New York Times.
95  In response, 
the Department of Health Education and Welfare (DHEW) appointed the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study Ad Hoc Panel to review the Tuskegee study as well as the department's policies and 
procedures for the protection of human subjects.  The ad hoc panel found, despite the existence 
of the 1966 PHS rules, that neither DHEW nor any other agency in the government had adequate 
policies for oversight of human subjects research.  The panel recommended that the Tuskegee 
study be stopped immediately and that remaining subjects be given necessary medical care 
resulting from their participation, and also that Congress establish “a permanent body with the 
authority to regulate at least all federally supported research involving human subjects.”
96 
In 1973, Senator Edward Kennedy introduced a bill to create a National Human 
Experimentation Board, as recommended by the Tuskegee Panel.  It became clear, however, that 
the bill, which would have created a national regulatory body to oversee all federally funded 
research, would not succeed.  Senator Kennedy, thus, introduced a bill that would become the 
National Research Act, which created the National Commission for the Protection of Human 
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, and approved of soon-to-be promulgated 
regulations of DHEW, in return for DHEW issuing human subject research regulations.
97  As a 
result, the agency responsible for the greatest proportion of human subject research would 
promulgate regulations for the protection of subjects, but oversight in general was left to each 
agency instead of one independent regulatory body.
98  In May 1974, DHEW published its new 
regulations, which notably required that each grantee institution form a committee to approve all 
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research proposals before they were passed to DHEW for consideration.  Such a committee 
became known as an institutional review board (IRB).  The regulations also defined the 
procedure and substantive criteria for obtaining informed consent.  In June, the National 
Research Act was passed.
99 
With the passage of the National Research Act, the National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical and Behavioral Research was formed.
100  The 
report of the commission, the Belmont Report of April 1979, states three basic ethical principles 
and guidelines for research involving human subjects: 
1.  Respect for Persons. Respect for persons incorporates at least two ethical convictions; 
first, that individuals should be treated as autonomous agents, and second, that 
persons with diminished autonomy are entitled to protection…. In most cases of 
research involving human subjects, respect for persons demands that subjects enter 
into the research voluntarily and with adequate information…. 
2.  Beneficence. Persons are treated in an ethical manner not only by respecting their 
decisions and protecting them from harm, but also by making efforts to secure their 
well being…. The term "beneficence" is often understood to cover acts of kindness or 
charity that go beyond strict obligation. In this document, beneficence is understood 
in a stronger sense as an obligation. Two general rules have been formulated as 
complementary expressions of beneficent actions in this sense: (1) do not harm and 
(2) maximize possible benefits and minimize possible harms…. 
3.  Justice.  Who ought to receive the benefits of research and bear its burdens?  This is a 
question of justice, in the sense of “fairness in distribution” or “what is deserved.” 
…[T]he selection of research subjects needs to be scrutinized in order to determine 
whether some classes (e.g., welfare patients, particular racial and ethnic minorities, or 
persons confined to institutions) are being systematically selected simply because of 
their easy availability, their compromised position, or their manipulability, rather than 
for reasons directly related to the problem being studied….
101 
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Applications of the three principles were given as “informed consent,” “assessment of risks and 
benefits,” and “selection of subjects.”
102   
The Belmont Report dealt only with research conducted or sponsored by DHEW (which 
was succeeded by the Department of Health and Human Services), but it was eventually 
recommended as the policy for all federal agencies.
 103  In 1981, the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) revised their respective 
human subjects regulations to be as compatible as possible with the Belmont Report.
104  Most 
significantly, in 1991, the Belmont Report became the basis of the Federal Policy for the 
Protection of Human Subjects, or the “Common Rule,” when 15 federal departments and 
agencies published and codified the language of the HHS regulations, 45 CFR, part 46, in their 
own chapter of the Code of Federal Regulations.
105  Under the Common Rule, an IRB has the 
authority to approve, require modifications to, or disprove of a research activity covered by the 
policy.  The Rule prescribes requirements for the membership of an IRB along with the criteria 
an IRB must follow in reviewing proposed research activity, and performing continuing review 
of research.
106  The criteria for approval of proposed research, all of which the IRB must 
determine to be satisfied, are laid out in §46.111 of the Rule: 
(1) Risks to subjects are minimized: (i) By using procedures which are consistent with 
sound research design and which do not unnecessarily expose subjects to risk, and (ii) 
whenever appropriate, by using procedures already being performed on the subjects for 
diagnostic or treatment purposes. 
(2) Risks to subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, 
and the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result. In 
                                                        
102 Id. 
103 PAUL F. BASCH, VACCINES AND WORLD HEALTH: SCIENCE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 87 
(Oxford University Press 1994). 
104 Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects ('Common Rule'), U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/commonrule/. 
105 Id. 
106 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.109 (2009).    31 
evaluating risks and benefits, the IRB should consider only those risks and benefits that 
may result from the research (as distinguished from risks and benefits of therapies 
subjects would receive even if not participating in the research). The IRB should not 
consider possible long-range effects of applying knowledge gained in the research…as 
among those research risks that fall within the purview of its responsibility. 
(3) Selection of subjects is equitable. In making this assessment the IRB should take into 
account the purposes of the research and the setting in which the research will be 
conducted and should be particularly cognizant of the special problems of research 
involving vulnerable populations, such as children, prisoners, pregnant women, mentally 
disabled persons, or economically or educationally disadvantaged persons. 
(4) Informed consent will be sought from each prospective subject or the subject's legally 
authorized representative… 
(5) Informed consent will be appropriately documented… 
(6) When appropriate, the research plan makes adequate provision for monitoring the 
data collected to ensure the safety of subjects. 
(7) When appropriate, there are adequate provisions to protect the privacy of subjects and 
to maintain the confidentiality of data. 
(b) When some or all of the subjects are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue 
influence, such as children, prisoners, pregnant women, mentally disabled persons, or 
economically or educationally disadvantaged persons, additional safeguards have been 
included in the study to protect the rights and welfare of these subjects. 
 
These IRB requirements, a further evolution of earlier peer review requirements, have the virtue 
of dealing with another recurring issue in ethical evaluation of experiments.  Namely, while peer 
review addresses the difficulties that medical researchers face in seeing the ethical problems with 
their own experiments, it does not necessarily go so far as to subject medical experiments to the 
moral judgment of the general public.  After all, peer review consists of the judgment of 
colleagues within the medical profession, who may also be entrenched in the mindset of the 
medical research community, and thus limited in their ability to see ethical problems in 
experiments.  The criteria in the Common Rule have the virtue of specifically iterating issues that 
would be relevant to the moral judgment of an America layman, such as whether the subjects are 
a part of a vulnerable population. 
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  In December 1974, the New York Times reported that the CIA had conducted illegal 
domestic activities, including experiments on U.S. citizens, during the 1960s.
107  Prompted by 
these claims, a presidential commission under Vice President Nelson Rockefeller and 
congressional committee under Senator Frank Church of Idaho were established to investigate 
the domestic activities of the CIA, FBI, and intelligence-related agencies of the military.
108   
In the forthcoming summer of 1975, the Rockefeller Commission held hearings and 
issued a report that revealed the CIA’s MKULTRA project.  The report disclosed that the CIA 
had tested behavior-influencing drugs, such as LSD, on unwitting human subjects in the United 
States, for the purpose of countering the clandestine use of such drugs by the then enemies of the 
U.S., namely the Soviet Union and North Korea.
109 The Commission declared that testing 
potentially dangerous drugs on unsuspecting U.S. citizens was clearly illegal.
110  The report 
noted that following the Inspector General’s discovery of the testing, new stringent criteria were 
issued prohibiting drug testing by the CIA on unknowing persons.  Between 1963 and 1967, it 
indicated, the testing of drugs continued on voluntary subjects, primarily inmate volunteers at 
various correctional facilities, and all drug testing programs were ended in 1967.
111  
  In April of 1976, the Church Committee issued its report, which also described the CIA’s 
experimental programs on unwitting human subjects.  The report stated that the continuation of 
the studies, for years after the danger to the subjects was known, demonstrated a fundamental 
disregard for the value of human life, and that the Committee’s investigation had raised serious 
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questions about the adequacy of command and control procedures within the CIA and military 
intelligence.
112  For instance, the report described that the CIA’s normal administrative controls 
were waived for programs involving chemical and biological agents to protect their security, and 
that this had produced “the paradoxical effect of providing less restrictive administrative controls 
and less effective internal review for controversial and highly sensitive projects….”
113 The report 
also explained that because the testing programs were considered so sensitive by the agencies 
administering them, few people, even within the agencies, knew of the programs.
114  The report 
quotes the CIA Inspector General: “the knowledge that the Agency is engaging in unethical and 
illicit activities would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic circles and would be 
detrimental to the accomplishment of its missions.”
115 
On August 3, 1977, the U.S. Senate Committee on Human Resources held a Joint 
Hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Health and 
Scientific Research to discuss MKULTRA.
116  Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts expressed 
outrage at the project, and stated that the CIA itself acknowledged that the LSD tests on 
unwitting human subjects, for one, made little scientific sense – that the agents doing the 
monitoring were not qualified scientific observers and, moreover, the subjects were rarely 
accessible for follow-up beyond the first hours of the test.
117  Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director 
of Central Intelligence, testified before the Joint Hearing, presenting newly discovered findings 
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about MKULTRA since the Church and Rockefeller reports.
118  After his testimony, Senator 
Kennedy addressed the Admiral, stating, “I did not get much of a feeling in reviewing your 
statement here this morning of the kind of abhorrence to this type of past activity which I think 
the American people would certainly deplore and much I believe that you do.”  In response, 
Admiral Turner stated: 
Senator Kennedy, it is totally abhorrent to me to think of using a human being as a guinea 
pig and in any way jeopardizing his life and his health, no matter how great the cause.  I 
am not here to pass judgment on my predecessors, but I can assure that this is totally 
beyond the pale of my contemplation of activities that the CIA or any other of our 
intelligence agencies should undertake.  I am taking and have taken what I believe are 
adequate steps to insure that such things are not continuing today.
119 
 
Asked to describe these steps, Admiral Turner explained that he had asked for a special report 
assuring him that there were no extant drug activities involving experimentation conducted by 
the CIA, and that he had ordered a special check of storage places for certification that there 
were no unauthorized chemical or biological materials in the CIA’s possession.  Beyond that, he 
stated: “…I have to rely in large measure on my sense of command and direction of the people 
and their knowledge of the attitude I have just expressed…in this regard.”
120 
  With the airing of the CIA experiments, similar stories about Army experiments emerged.  
In 1975, the secretary of the Army responded by ordering the Army inspector general to conduct 
an investigation.  In the course of the investigation, the still-classified 1953 Wilson 
Memorandum was discovered, and consequently declassified in 1975.
121  The inspector general 
found that the Army had, in accordance with the Wilson Memorandum, largely used only 
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volunteers for its drug testing.   The inspector general also found, however, that the volunteers 
were not fully informed, and that the methods used to recruit them were, in many cases, contrary 
to the intent of the Army policies governing the use of volunteers for research.
122 
  Exemplary of the Army’s practice was the case of James B. Stanley.  In February of 
1958, Stanley was stationed with his wife and children at Fort Knox, Kentucky.  Responding to a 
posted notice, he volunteered to be a subject in a study advertised as developing and testing 
measures against chemical weapons.  Stanley was transferred, along with thousands of other men 
who volunteered, to Edgewood Arsenal in Aberdeen, Maryland, where he was a subject in the 
Army’s LSD experiments.
123  Stanley claimed that he was never told that he was given a 
psychoactive drug for the experiment, and that he was not debriefed or monitored for 
hallucination, which he thereafter experienced.  He discovered that he had been given LSD in 
1975, when he received a letter from the Army asking him to come to the Walter Reed Army 
Medical Center in Washington for a follow-up study of the LSD subjects.  In the meantime, he 
had suffered emotional problems.
124 
  Like many others subjects and their survivors did during this period, as revelations about 
the CIA and Army experiments came out, Stanley brought a suit against the federal government 
for conducting the experiments.  Some of the plaintiffs managed to receive compensation 
through court order, out-of-court settlement, or acts of Congress.  Stanley’s case, however, was 
dismissed by the Supreme Court in 1987.
125  A divided court, 5-4, found that, like all other 
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current or former members of the Armed Forces, Stanley was barred from suing the United 
States for injuries incurred “incident to service,” a legal rule known as the Feres Doctrine.
126  By 
the majority’s account, departing from the Feres Doctrine would lead to a judicial encroachment 
upon the province of the military.  The majority opinion states, “a test for liability dependent on 
the extent to which particular suits would call into question military discipline and decision 
making would itself require judicial inquiry into, and hence intrusion upon, military matters.”
127  
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan invoked the Nuremberg Code, and stated that military 
officials had acted in defiance of its principles.
128  Finally, Justice O’Connor, dissenting 
separately, wrote that no judicially crafted rule should insulate the government from liability for 
the experimentation it conducted in contravention to the Nuremberg principles.
129 
  On the one hand, Stanley’s defeat showed how toothless the Nuremberg-based Wilson 
Memorandum was, inasmuch as it was in effect during Stanley’s participation in the LSD 
experiments, but could not be used as an avenue of recovery when that policy was violated and 
caused him harm.
130  On the other hand, however, the case’s dissenting opinions put the Army 
and the rest of the government on notice that the use of individuals for experimentation without 
obtaining informed consent was unlawful.
131   
 
In the fall of 1990, as the Pentagon made its preparations for the invasion of Kuwait, 
intelligence reports about Saddam Hussein’s chemical and biological warfare capacity prompted 
inquiries about medical protections for the troops.  There was concern that service-members 
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might face nerve gas, anthrax bacteria, and botulinum toxin, all of which can cause death within 
days.
132  Each of these agents could in theory be countered with protective medications.
133  
During the buildup of forces, the Pentagon approached the new FDA commissioner, Dr. David 
Kessler, requesting a waiver of the FDA’s normal informed-consent requirement for 
“investigational drugs.”  The request was based on the need to protect combat troops with 
methods thought to provide a reasonable prospect of defense against the threats.  It was claimed 
that it was an extreme measure, demanded by the circumstances.
134 
In response, the FDA adopted Rule 23(d), which created an exception to its regulations, 
allowing the commissioner to waive the consent requirement for those combat situations in 
which consent is “not feasible.”  The rule requires the commissioner to consider whatever 
evidence there is about the safety and effectiveness of the drug, the context in which it is to be 
used, the type of condition it is intended to treat or prevent, and the nature of information to be 
provided the recipients concerning the risks and benefits of taking the drugs.
135 
Thus, the Pentagon’s request was granted.  During the Gulf War, all of the troops were 
given pyridostigmine bromide (PB) pills, which may enhance nerve gas antidotes like atropine if 
taken before exposure.  About 250,000 of the troops elected to take them.  About 150,000 troops 
received at least one anthrax vaccine, and about 8,000 received at least one does of botulinum 
toxin vaccine.  The botulinum toxin vaccine was considered to be “investigational” by the FDA, 
and PB had not been approved for use in the military against chemical weapons.
136  The FDA’s 
relative lack of experience with the medicines, and the fact that it gave the Pentagon special 
                                                        
132 MORENO, supra note 5, at 269. 
133 Id. at 270. 
134 Id.  21 C.F.R. § 50.23(d). 
135 Id. at 271. 
136 Id. at 270.   38 
permission to use the “unapproved drugs” on service-members without their informed consent, 
made it appear that the soldiers had been used as guinea pigs.  Yet, even if there were something 
to learn from the incident as an experiment, few records were kept, beyond the rough numbers of 
how many took the drugs.  Moreover, when veterans started to have medical problems, there 
were no records to identify who actually took the drugs and under what conditions.
137 
In September 1999, President Clinton answered these concerns with Executive Order 
13139, “Improving Health Protection of Military Personnel Participating in Particular Military 
Operations.”
138 Regarding the administration of investigational new drugs to members of the 
armed forces, it says that although it is the expectation that the U.S. Government will administer 
products approved for their intended used by FDA, in some cases a product that has not yet been 
approved by FDA might be administered to deployed military personnel, under certain 
circumstances and strict controls.
139  Namely, a product not approved for its intended use by 
FDA might be administered when the Secretary of Defense “considers a product to represent the 
most appropriate countermeasure for diseases endemic to the area of operations or to protect 
against possible chemical, biological, or radiological weapons….”
140  
The Order also provides for a procedure whereby the President may waive the informed 
consent requirement when “absolutely necessary.”  Specifically, it provides that DOD must 
obtain informed consent from each individual unless the Secretary can justify the need for a 
waiver.  To waive informed consent, the President must then make a written determination that 
obtaining informed consent is not feasible, is contrary to the best interests of the member, or is 
not in the interest of national security.  In making this determination the President must apply the 
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standards and criteria set out in FDA regulations.
141  The Secretary may also request that the 
President waive informed consent with respect to the administration of an investigational drug, 
and the Order sets out several requirements for this process, which includes consultation with the 
FDA.   
The Executive Order also acknowledges and addresses problems with the Gulf War 
administration of investigational drugs by requiring DOD to provide, to all military personnel, 
ongoing training and health risk communication on the requirements of using an investigational 
new drug in support of a military operation to all military personnel.  Under the Executive Order, 
such training and health risk communication must include, at a minimum, the basis for any 
determination by the President that informed consent is or may not be feasible, the means for 
tracking use and adverse effects of the investigational drug, the benefits and risks of using the 
investigational drug, and a statement that the drug is not approved (or not approved for the 
intended use).
142  Thus, once more, controversy led to further, and detailed, policy regarding 
experimental measures on human subjects. 
   
By way of conclusion, it may be apropos to note that “…the axiom that history repeats 
itself was never truer than in the case of human experimentation.”
143  Indeed, as this paper has 
aimed to illustrate, the history of research using human subjects has demonstrated persistently 
recurring themes.  To recapitulate several of these, from Reed’s yellow fever experiments to the 
Gulf War vaccinations, research using human subjects has often been propelled by military 
necessity and national security concerns.  Part and parcel to the both nature of military and 
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national security intelligence, as well as the difficult ethical issues that inhere in medical 
research, much of this research has proceeded in secrecy.  As a result, several implications of 
secrecy in research have pervaded the history, such as the tension between secrecy and the 
development of policy, the tension between secrecy and the effective communication of policy, 
and the tension between secrecy and the ability of the moral conscience of the general public to 
inform human research policies.  Similarly, a recounting of this history repeatedly demonstrates 
that medical scientists have at least two distinct difficulties that pose recurring problems in 
human experimentation; namely, the difficulty of operating within an ambiguous realm between 
medical practice and medical research, and the difficulty of seeing ethical problems that inhere in 
one’s own medical research.  Finally, perhaps most prominently, the history makes evident that 
scandal has driven the evolution of human research policy in the United States.  There is little 
doubt in this author’s view that this history will continue to repeat itself.  Still, the evolution of 
policy herein described has come quite far in establishing important ethical standards and 
safeguards in human research, and this, too, is a trajectory on which the United States is likely to 
continue. 
 